Politics
Iran War Is Accelerating America’s Decline in Southeast Asia
Washington’s war with Iran may be unfolding thousands of miles away, but in Southeast Asia its political aftershocks are immediate and measurable. Energy shocks, disrupted trade routes, and deepening uncertainty about US leadership are quietly recalibrating regional alignments.
An Unnecessary War
Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan stated in late March, “I was surprised by the onset of hostilities. I did not think it was necessary. I do not think it is helpful. Even now, there are doubts about legality. For 80 years, the US underwrote a system of globalization based on UN Charter principles, multilateralism, territorial integrity, and sovereign equality. It led to an unprecedented period of global prosperity and peace.”
This statement is hardly surprising. Southeast Asia has long approached great power rivalry through a logic of hedging, seeking to benefit from both the United States and China without committing fully to either. Yet this delicate balance depends on predictability. The U.S.–Iran war has undermined precisely that.
Recent surveys indicate that regional elites increasingly view US global leadership as a source of instability rather than order. The 2026 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute survey shows that concern over US foreign policy now outweighs even anxieties about the South China Sea, with over half of respondents identifying American leadership as their primary geopolitical worry. At the same time, a narrow majority—52 percent—would now align with China over the United States if forced to choose. In Indonesia (80%), Malaysia (68%) and Singapore (66%), respondents show a clear preference for alignment with China over the US. By contrast, only 23% of Filipino respondents express a similar inclination toward China. This shift is not occurring in isolation. The Iran war has amplified an existing credibility problem for Washington, compounding its trust deficit across Asia and reinforcing perceptions that US strategy is reactive and militarized rather than stabilizing.
For Southeast Asian states, the issue is not ideological alignment with Iran or opposition to the United States per se. Rather, it is a pragmatic assessment of costs. War appears unnecessary because it delivers no clear regional benefit while introducing systemic risks. Unlike Cold War interventions framed within a coherent strategic doctrine, this conflict is seen as detached from Southeast Asia’s core security concerns—economic growth, maritime stability, and supply chain resilience. The Philippines may stand as a partial exception due to its treaty alliance with Washington and heightened tensions with China in the South China Sea. But even there, alignment reflects security dependence rather than regional consensus. Across the broader ASEAN landscape—from Indonesia to Vietnam—the prevailing sentiment is unease rather than endorsement.
The Energy Shock
If perceptions of war are shaped by strategic skepticism, they are hardened by material realities. Southeast Asia’s vulnerability to Middle Eastern instability is profound and quantifiable. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), roughly 60 percent of Southeast Asia’s oil imports originate from the Middle East, making the region acutely sensitive to disruptions linked to the Iran conflict. The stakes are enormous: in 2023 alone, Southeast Asian economies spent about $130 billion on oil imports, a figure projected to rise significantly in coming decades.
This dependency is not merely a matter of trade; it is a structural vulnerability. The Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint directly affected by tensions involving Iran, carries nearly 20 million barrels of oil per day globally. Any disruption to this corridor reverberates immediately through Asian markets. The unnecessary US war on Iran has therefore translated into higher energy prices, increased shipping risks, and greater fiscal pressure on import-dependent economies. For developing Southeast Asian states, these shocks are not abstract—they directly affect inflation, industrial output, and political stability.
Crucially, these material consequences reinforce negative perceptions of US policy. The war is not viewed as an isolated geopolitical event but as a trigger for cascading economic disruptions. In a region where economic performance underpins political legitimacy, this matters deeply.
Moreover, the timing is particularly damaging. Southeast Asia is already navigating an energy transition while facing rising demand; the IEA projects that the region will become a net importer of gas by the late 2020s, further increasing its exposure to external shocks. It will also be importing more oil in the future than it does currently. The Iran conflict exacerbates these vulnerabilities at a moment when resilience is already under strain.
China’s Strategic Opening
Where Washington appears destabilizing, Beijing benefits from comparison. Southeast Asian states remain wary of Chinese assertiveness—particularly in the South China Sea—but the Iran war has reinforced a different calculus: in moments of global crisis, China is seen as relatively more predictable in its responses than the US.
The conflict has also highlighted a deeper structural reality. Disruptions triggered by US actions—especially in energy markets and maritime trade—affect both Southeast Asia and China in similar ways. This shared exposure narrows strategic distance, positioning both as vulnerable to external shocks originating beyond the region. As a result, the crisis strengthens the case for a more regional approach to global instability, one centered on coordination and continuity rather than alignment.
This does not dissolve existing tensions, but it does reorder priorities. When energy insecurity and economic volatility become immediate concerns, disputes in the South and East China Seas recede in relative urgency. The Iran war, therefore, has not resolved regional frictions; it has reframed them within a broader hierarchy of risks.
China’s advantage lies less in trust than in positioning. As US actions are increasingly associated with disruption, China’s relative predictability—and its inclusion within a shared field of vulnerability—makes it a more viable partner in navigating systemic crises, even if it remains a contested one. Its active role in diplomacy only underscores this perception.
The Cost of Strategic Distance
The most significant consequence of the US–Iran war in Southeast Asia is not immediate realignment but gradual estrangement. The region is not pivoting dramatically away from Washington; it is drifting incrementally, pragmatically, and perhaps irreversibly.
This drift reflects a deeper structural tension in US foreign policy. Actions taken in one region are no longer geographically contained; they are interpreted globally, filtered through local vulnerabilities, and judged against competing models of power. In Southeast Asia, the Iran war is not assessed on its Middle Eastern merits but on its regional consequences, and those consequences are overwhelmingly negative.
For Washington, the lesson is stark. Military engagements that lack clear strategic relevance to key partners risk eroding influence far beyond the battlefield. For Southeast Asia, the lesson is equally clear: in an era of interconnected crises, stability is the most valuable currency of power—and increasingly, it is China that appears to supply it.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
No comments:
Post a Comment