Politics
Does the AUKUS have a future?
The Trump administration’s review of the AUKUS pact exposes deep uncertainties in U.S. commitment and capabilities, offering Australia a strategic opportunity to reconsider its role in the trilateral alliance.
The AUKUS in Disarray
When the Trump administration launched early in June a “review” of the multibillion-dollar AUKUS pact, it sent a shockwave across the Pacific, causing Canberra to tremble. The review announcement, according to the US Department of Defence, is meant to ensure that the pact is properly aligned with the President’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) agenda. In effect, part of it means asking both Australia and the UK to raise their shares of the cost of the programme, which was originally supposed to supply nuclear-powered submarines to Australia before the allies make a new fleet by sharing cutting-edge research and technology. Both the UK and Australia have thus far not confirmed their readiness to meet America’s demands. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told his Australian counterpart in early June that the country should increase defence spending to 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product, echoing demands that the Trump administration has been making of allies in Europe. But Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia said this week that “I think that Australia should decide what we spend on Australia’s defence. Simple as that”. There is, thus, a very clear disagreement affecting the pact.
In reality, this dissonance is not difficult to understand, given that the pact was signed by leaders in all three countries no longer in power. This is particularly the case in the US, where the Trump administration has a credible history of withdrawing from agreed pacts. The first Trump administration, for instance, withdrew from the Iran-nuclear deal signed by the Obama administration in 2015–a decision that directly paved the way for the Iran-Israel war and the US recent bombing of Iranian nuclear infrastructure. In addition, President Trump also withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) immediately after assuming office in 2016. Will the AUKUS be put into the dustbin of history similarly?
Many in the US share this fear. A letter addressed to defence secretary Pete Hegseth, signed by five Republican and Democrat lawmakers, urged the Pentagon to back the Pact. Their fears are only compounded by the fact that the review is headed by Elbridge Colby, who has previously been critical of the AUKUS. In a speech last year, he publicly questioned why the US would give away “this crown jewel asset when we most need it.” In Australia, however, the review means not only a potential end of the pact itself but also an assessment about the extent to which Canberra can rely on Washington to build its defences. If Trump scraps the AUKUS, or even if he significantly alters its provisions, Washington’s standing in the Indo-Pacific region will be majorly diminished.
Facing Practical Problems
For the US, however, what matters more than its standing in the Indo-Pacific region is its capacity to project power in an uncompromising manner. At the heart of the review—which once again is aimed at making the pact properly align with Trump’s America First agenda—are practical problems facing America’s ship building industry. Can America build enough (Virginia-class) submarines for its own use by 2030, i.e., when it is supposed to transfer (some of its) its existing submarines to Australia?
For the pact to work—which is supposed to transfer 18 submarines to Australia by 2040–the US needs to be able to produce at least two submarines every year until 2028 and 2.33 per year thereafter. However, reports show that the US shipbuilding industry is in serious disarray, facing workforce shortages and budget constraints, making it problematic to meet sales to Australia and address a production backlog. These challenges have limited production to about 1.2 submarines per year since 2022. Because the US is unable to meet the pact’s demands and because meeting these demands could put Washington’s own strategic needs in jeopardy, the Trump administration might find the pact violating its America First agenda. In that case, the AUKUS might hit the bottom of the Pacific sooner than expected.
Is this bad news for Australia?
If the US withdraws from the AUKUS, does it necessarily mean bad news for Australia? While AUKUS might give Australia access to (used) submarines, the downside of this pact is that it also massively increases Canberra’s dependence on the Anglo-American axis. On the contrary, if the US withdraws from the pact, it gives Canberra strategic flexibility to manage its ties with the US and the EU and China in ways that best serve its national interests. In fact, the second scenario works best for Australia in all possible ways.
The purpose of the AUKUS is not simply to enhance Australia’s capability, but also to establish it as a proactive player in the Indo-Pacific region. However, there is little denying that China and Australia don’t have any direct disputes between themselves, making it highly unlikely that China will ever want to attack Australian territory. On the other hand, Australia can do well to manage its ties with China—which is also its largest trading partner—by further deepening its trade ties with Beijing.
The Trump administration’s decision to review—and possibly scrap or downgrade—the AUKUS could be a blessing in disguise for Canberra. A realistic counter review by Canberra should allow it to pursue alternative approaches.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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